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In this paper we study the determinants of the strength of patent enforcement in 43 member 
countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1998 and 2011, a period after the 
signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. We 
do so by building on and expanding the seminal work of Ginarte and Park (1997) on the pre-
TRIPS determinants of patent rights in the years 1960-1990. We find that in the years after 
TRIPS was signed, the strength of patent enforcement of a country is positively determined 
by two variables that signify the usage of the patent and intellectual property system, and the 
number of patent and trademark applications. We also find that the level of research and 
development expenditure, the quality of human capital, and the level of development of a 
country have positive effects on the strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice. 
Intellectual property rights enforcement is one of the key investment-related policies included 
in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development. Identifying the determinants of strong patent 
systems will help policymakers at the national and supranational levels to design and 
implement effective policies that strengthen national patent systems, thereby enhancing 
economic benefits such as greater levels of commercialization of intangible assets and greater 
levels of international trade and investment. 
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1. Introduction 
The signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement 
in 1994 was a key milestone and turning point for the evolution of stronger patent systems in 
World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. The TRIPS agreement set the 
minimum regulatory standards of intellectual property (IP) protection with an aim to “reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade” (WTO, 2018). This was because the 
strength of a country’s patent system is an important factor that affects international 
investments by influencing e.g. the level and extent to which transnational corporations 
consider investing in and transferring advanced technological assets to a host country 
(UNCTAD, 2010, 2013, 2015). Effective national patent systems comprise two components: 
(a) the strength of patent law on the books, and (b) the strength of the enforcement of patent 
law in practice (Papageorgiadis and McDonald, 2019). Since the signing of TRIPS, patent 
law protection in developed and developing WTO member countries has strengthened 
significantly and become more harmonized (Taubman et al., 2012). While differences in 
patent legislation do exist, the divergence, especially in terms of minimum standards, is not 
as wide as it used to be prior to the signing of TRIPS (Park, 2008).  
In contrast, the implementation of the TRIPS agreement did not affect the levels of 
strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice, in the way that this is e.g. applied by 
public enforcement agents (Brander et al., 2017). Although the TRIPS agreement set clear 
requirements for the inclusion of specific enforcement procedures in the legislative 
frameworks of countries, it did not set obligations on how effectively patent law should be 
enforced in practice (WTO, 2018). Therefore, although a strong patent legislative framework 
may exist in the post-TRIPS patent system of a particular country, these laws may not be 
enforced in practice by public enforcement agents (Arora, 2009). As a result there are still 
wide differences in the levels of patent enforcement strength between countries 
(Papageorgiadis et al., 2014), and these differences have now become the dominant factor of 
the divergence between the patent systems of WTO member countries after the signing of 
TRIPS (Correa, 2009; Fink, 2009). In fact, weak levels of patent enforcement strength are 
commonly identified as an impediment to international trade and investment, turning the 
levels of patent enforcement strength into a common area of discussion in bilateral and 
multilateral trade negotiations (Papageorgiadis et al., 2014; Alexiou et al., 2016). For 
example, in the recent trade dispute between the United States and China, the Trump 
administration announced “plans for a 25 per cent tariff on 1,333 Chinese products ranging 
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from industrial robots to locomotives in retaliation for what it said had been decades of state-
backed [IP] theft by Beijing” (Financial Times, 2018). 
Identifying the key factors that contribute to the strengthening of patent law protection 
and enforcement can help policymakers design and implement effective policies that will 
strengthen the patent system of their country or region. Strengthening a country’s patent 
system to a level that is compatible with a country’s development and technological 
capabilities is desirable as this is expected to boost economic growth, by attracting higher 
levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and innovation, and lead to greater levels of 
commercialization of intangible assets (Pereira, 2006; UNCTAD, 2015). For instance, the 
strength of the United Kingdom’s IP system has enabled growth in IP-protected intangible 
assets investments from £47 billion in 2000 to £70 billion in 2014 (UK IP Office, 2017). The 
potential benefits of strong patent systems have motivated the IP offices of some countries to 
design detailed strategic actions with an aim to improve their IP systems. Such was the case 
with the 10-year IP master plan of Singapore, which initiated policies that can enable 
Singapore to strengthen its IP system and become an IP hub in the region. The reforms it 
implemented involved giving research and development (R&D) incentives to small and 
medium-sized companies, upgrading the IP capabilities and expertise of the local workforce, 
and boosting the number of patent applications in the country (Government of Singapore and 
Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, 2017). Similarly, China’s 12th five-year plan (2011-
2015) incentivized Chinese firms to make use of the patent system by subsidizing the cost of 
patent applications (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011). The 
main expectation for such subsidies is that as the number of patent owners in a country rises, 
this will increase the pressure on public patent enforcement agents to enforce patent law more 
effectively in practice (Yang et al., 2004). The outcome of such initiatives takes time to 
materialize, and therefore the transition of a country’s patent system from weak to strong is 
expected to take years or even decades (Peng et al., 2017).  
The determinants of patent protection strength was the focus of the seminal work by 
Ginarte and Park (1997), which has been cited more than 1,500 times according to Google 
Scholar.2 They investigated the determinants of patent protection of 110 countries in 1960-
1990, a time period prior to the signing of the TRIPS agreement, and found that R&D 
activity, market freedom and openness were important determinants of the strength of 
                                                             
2 1,568 citations as of November 2018. 
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national patent law protection as it appears on the books. In other words, these three factors 
were important characteristics of countries that offered strong patent law protection pre-
TRIPS. However, two decades after the publication of Ginarte and Park’s study, and after the 
signing and implementation of TRIPS, patent systems have evolved considerably, and there is 
no updated empirical evidence regarding the determinants of (a) the strength of patent law 
protection, and (b) the strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice in the post-TRIPS 
period.  
In this research note we update and expand the study by Ginarte and Park (1997) and 
make two contributions to the international business literature studying patent systems. First, 
we study the previously unidentified determinants of the strength of enforcement of patent 
law in practice for 43 WTO member countries in the post-TRIPS years, 1998-2011. We 
follow the same methodology as Ginarte and Park; however, we use the composite index of 
patent systems strength developed by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) to approximate for the 
strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice (Ahammad et al., 2018; Papageorgiadis 
et al., 2019). 3 We find strong and consistent evidence that higher numbers of patent and 
trademark applications filed in a country have a significantly positive effect on the 
strengthening of the enforcement of patent law in practice. In addition, we find that R&D 
expenditure, the level of economic development and the quality of human capital also 
stimulate the strengthening of patent enforcement. Second, we update the Ginarte and Park 
study by investigating the determinants of the strength of protection of patent law in the 
period after TRIPS. We find consistent evidence that the level of R&D expenditure in a 
country and the level of economic development continue to be two important determinants of 
the strength of patent law in WTO member countries in the post-TRIPS time period. We also 
find evidence to suggest that the quality of human capital in a country is a new post-TRIPS 
determinant of the strength of patent law.  
In the next section, we briefly discuss the two complementary measures used as 
proxies for two distinct aspects of the strength of patent systems, the strength of patent 
enforcement and the strength of patent law on the books (Papageorgiadis and Sharma, 2016). 
Following the Ginarte and Park (1997) empirical approach, in section three we present the 
empirical model, estimation, and variables applied and focus the discussion on the additional 
(contemporary) variables that we incorporated in the estimation. We provide the results and                                                              3 The index of Ginarte and Park and its update by Park (2008) measure the strength of patent law protection in a 
country but not the strength of patent enforcement (Brander et al., 2017).  
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discussion of the findings in section four. In section five, we discuss the policy implications 
of the study and make suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Measures 
The dependent variable for the estimation of the determinants of the strength of patent law is 
the version of the Ginarte and Park (1997) index updated by Park (2008). This version of the 
index is the most widely used in empirical studies in the literature. The scores of the Park 
(2008) index capture the availability of patent-related legislation that enables the functioning 
of a patent system. The index is composed of five components that capture the (i) granting of 
patent rights for specific innovations, (ii) signatory status of a country to international treaties 
that are relevant to patent rights (such as TRIPS), (iii) duration of protection for the patent 
rights granted, (iv) availability of legal mechanisms that can enable the enforcement of patent 
rights and, (v) legislation that can potentially restrict patent rights. The unweighted sum of 
these five components determines the overall score for each of the countries included in the 
index.  
We use the index by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) as the dependent variable for the 
estimation of the strength of the enforcement of patent law in national patent systems in 
practice. It is important to note that the fourth component of the Ginarte and Park (1997) 
index, which captures the availability of legislation that can enable the enforcement of patent 
rights, has been commonly misperceived as a measure of patent enforcement strength (Arora, 
2009; Brander et al., 2017). In fact, as Park (2008, p. 761) highlights in the latest update of 
the index: “This index was designed to provide an indicator of strength of patent protection, 
not the quality of patent systems”. In contrast, the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index uses 
both reports and perceptions of effectiveness to measure the strength of the enforcement of 
patent law in practice in the time period since the signing of TRIPS (Papageorgiadis and 
McDonald, 2019). It is the only longitudinal index to do so, and in so doing, this composite 
indicator measures the strength of eight enforcement-related components of national patent 
systems, thereby providing the most comprehensive approximation for the overall strength of 
enforcement of patent law in practice in the literature.  
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) developed the index following methodological 
recommendations from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(2008). The authors applied a transaction cost rationale to map how ineffective enforcement 
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activities, administration, and governing of enforcement-related aspects of a national patent 
system increase the transaction costs that patent owners face in 48 countries. The index 
scores are derived using secondary data that proxy for three types of transaction costs: (a) the 
servicing costs faced by patent owners in terms of the quality of patent administration in a 
given country, (b) the property rights protection costs incurred as a result of the 
ineffectiveness of the judiciary and the judicial process in a country, and (c) the monitoring 
costs that originate from the ineffectiveness of public and private agencies (e.g. police and 
customs) in enforcing patent rights, as well as the overall societal attitudes towards the 
enforcement-related aspects of patent rights which dictate the acceptability of enforcement 
actions in a given country.  
 
3. Empirical model and estimation 
As noted, the empirical approach of this research note follows the Ginarte and Park (1997) 
study. However, the difference is that we consider the determinants of the strength of patent 
law as well as the determinants of the strength of patent enforcement. The estimation is based 
on a panel of 43 WTO member countries for the period 1998-2011, and the estimation model 
can be written as follows:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                          (1) 
where y is the proxy of the strength of either patent law (first set of regressions, focusing on 
the determinants of the strength of patent law only) or the enforcement of patent law in 
practice (second set of regressions, focusing on the determinants of the strength of the 
enforcement of patent law in practice), x is the vector of all explanatory variables, lagged by 
one year to control for potential endogeneity (except for political freedom) and uit is the error 
term. 4 With regards to the explanatory variables, we include the same variables as those used 
by the Ginarte and Park (1997) study in all specifications. These are (i) GDP per capita, to 
proxy for the level of economic development (World Bank, 2015a); (ii) R&D expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2015b); (iii) secondary education enrolment rate, to proxy 
for the quality of human capital (World Bank, 2015c); (iv) the Index of Economic Freedom,                                                              
4 Our data set consists of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The number of countries 
included in our estimations is determined by the availability of data of the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index, 
which provides annual index scores for the years 1998-2011, for a maximum of 43 countries. Our data set 
therefore includes 43 countries whereas the Ginarte and Park (1997) data set included 48.  
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to proxy for the level of market freedom in a country (Heritage Foundation, 2015); (v) the 
sum of volume of exports and imports of a country over GDP, to proxy for the openness of 
the economy (World Bank, 2015d, 2015e), given that the data of Sachs et al. (1995) used by 
Ginarte and Park have not been updated with contemporary values; (vi) the political rights 
data made available by the Freedom House (2015), to proxy for political freedom as the 
political freedom data of Barro and Lee (1994) (used by Ginarte and Park, 1997) are not 
available for any of the years considered in our study.  
Further to the variables included in the Ginarte and Park (1997) study, we also take 
into account the potential effects of three additional variables which have become 
increasingly important in the time period studied. First, we consider the potential effects of 
the number of patent applications per capita and the number of trademark applications of 
residents and non-residents (WIPO, 2015). Higher levels of patent and trademark applications 
in a country indicate the desire of local and foreign companies to gain protection for their IP, 
as well as to (potentially) effectively enforce their legal rights in practice (Desyllas and Sako, 
2013). Higher levels of patent and trademark applications in a country are therefore expected 
to have a positive effect on the strength of patent law and the strength of the enforcement of 
patent law in practice. Second, we use a proxy measure for the level of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), defined as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio of GDP 
(World Bank, 2015f). This is because FDI commonly involves the transfer of technology 
from the headquarters of a company to a subsidiary in the host market (Dunning and Zhang, 
2008). Foreign firms frequently apply pressure to local governments to strengthen patent law 
and the enforcement of patent law in practice, so that they can retain the same business model 
as the one used in their home country and successfully appropriate the returns from their 
innovations in the host country (Zhang et al., 2010).  
Table 1 and figure 1 summarise the description of the variables together with the 
measures used and the sources of the data. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and 
Table 3 the correlation coefficients matrix.5 
--------------------------------Table 1 goes about here----------------------------- 
--------------------------------Figure 1 goes about here----------------------------- 
--------------------------------Table 2 goes about here-----------------------------                                                              
5 To consider the potential for multicollinearity, we conducted the variance inflation factor test for all 
specifications. The scores are all below 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern.  
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--------------------------------Table 3 goes about here----------------------------- 
4. Results 
Given the presence of country heterogeneity in our sample, we adopted a panel data analysis 
approach. In the first set of regressions (table 4) we use the Park (2008) index, which proxies 
for the strength of patent law as our dependent variable. Subsequently, we repeat the same set 
of estimations (table 5) using the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index, which proxies for the 
strength of enforcement of patent law in practice. We applied the feasible general least 
squares estimator, controlling for panel heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. The 
common characteristic of the three specifications is that we always include the proxies of the 
variables originally used in the Ginarte and Park (1997) study. Our specifications consider the 
variables included in that study together with two or all three of the contemporary variables 
discussed in section three. More precisely, the first specification (column 1) includes all the 
variables considered by Ginarte and Park (1997) plus FDI and trademark applications per 
capita. The second specification (column 2) replaces trademark applications per capita with 
patent applications per capita. The third estimation (column 3) includes all variables 
considered in our study.  
 
--------------------------------Table 4 goes about here----------------------------- 
--------------------------------Table 5 goes about here-----------------------------  
 
4.1 Determinants of the strength of patent law  
The results of the estimations focusing on the determinants of the strength of patent law 
reveal that two pre-TRIPS determinants identified in the Ginarte and Park (1997) study 
continue to be significant in the era since the signing of TRIPS. More specifically, similar to 
the finding of Ginarte and Park (1997), we find evidence that the GDP per capita and R&D 
expenditure have a positive and significant effect on the strength of patent law protection. 
The logarithm of real GDP is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent in all 
specifications, and the same positive sign is also found for the R&D expenditure (p < 5%) 
variable. Therefore, similarly to the situation in the pre-TRIPS years, the level of economic 
development and the amount of funds invested in R&D activities are significant factors that 
help strengthen patent law protection in all countries in our sample. In addition, while Ginarte 
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and Park (1997) found the secondary enrolment variable to have an insignificant effect, we 
find that in the years since the signing of TRIPS the quality of human capital has a highly 
significant positive effect on the strength of patent law (p < 1%). Together, these three 
aspects of a national economy can help create an ecosystem in which firms can develop 
higher-quality intellectual assets that require the granting of patent rights so that firms can 
successfully appropriate the returns on their innovations. 
 We also find that the variables for market freedom, openness and trademark 
applications per capita have a negative effect on the strength of patent law protection, with 
the effect of market freedom being significantly negative (p < 1%) in all specifications. The 
results for market freedom and openness are contrary to the results of the Ginarte and Park 
(1997) study. This finding reveals that the positive association between these two factors and 
patent law strength since the TRIPS signing has been reversed. This might have been caused 
by the fact that TRIPS helped to solve the international coordination problem but at the same 
time induced countries to move away from e.g. the Nash equilibrium degree of IP protection 
that would be predicted by a structured model of trade and innovation (Grossman and Lai, 
2004). In addition, we found that the three variables of political freedom, FDI and patent 
applications per capita have limited to no statistically significant effect across all three 
estimations (with the exception of FDI in one of the specifications). The insignificant effect 
of the political freedom variable is consistent with the results of Ginarte and Park (1997). In 
contrast, FDI levels and patent applications per capita are found to have no significant effect 
on the strength of patent law. This could be because the levels of FDI and numbers of patent 
applications can be mainly considered not as determinants but as outcomes, whose size 
depends on the strength of patent law. Indeed, there is consistent evidence that strengthening 
levels of patent law attract higher levels of FDI and lead to more firms seeking to formally 
register their patent rights in the country (Ushijima, 2013).  
 
4.2 Determinants of the strength of patent enforcement  
The results of all estimations on the determinants of the strength of enforcement of 
patent law in practice reveal the significant effect of two different factors compared with 
those influencing the strength of patent law protection. The results show that the number of 
patent and trademark applications in a country has a significant positive effect (p < 1%) on 
the strength of patent enforcement in almost all specifications. Whereas the number of patent 
and trademark applications was not found to affect the strength of patent law protection, the 
ability of patent owners to register and gain patent and trademark rights for the innovations 
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that they commercialize in a country was found to positively affect patent enforcement 
strength. This may be because higher volumes of intellectual asset ownership in a country 
could increase the number of requests that public patent enforcement agents receive, 
potentially leading them to increase their efforts, become more effective and achieve stronger 
enforcement of patent law in practice (Desyllas and Sako, 2013). This is not the case for the 
strengthening of patent law protection, given that the assigning of patent and trademark rights 
is an output of patent law protection and that most countries already offer TRIPS-level 
minimum standards of legal protection. 
The three determinants of the strength of patent law since the TRIPS signing, 
however, were consistently found to have a strong determinant effect on the strength of 
patent enforcement. GDP per capita, R&D expenditure and secondary school enrolment 
consistently had a highly significant positive effect (p < 1%) on the strength of the 
enforcement of patent law in practice. This important finding showcases that the determinants 
of the two aspects of the patent systems of countries in the years after the signing of the 
TRIPS agreement were positively affected by similar economic factors. Contrary to these 
three factors, the results of the estimations highlight that the remaining four variables have an 
insignificant effect on the strength of patent enforcement. We found no evidence that the 
variables of political freedom and openness have any significant effect. These results were 
consistent across all estimations. We also found evidence in only one out of three estimations 
that market freedom had a significant effect on the strength of patent enforcement. Finally, 
the FDI variable was found to be statistically significant and positive in two out of three 
estimations. Therefore, there is some evidence that FDI might have a positive effect on the 
strength of enforcement of patent law in practice. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Twenty years after the publication of the seminal study by Ginarte and Park (1997) on the 
determinants of the strength of patent systems, we revisited and expanded their work using 
data for the post-TRIPS signing time period of 1998-2011. In so doing, we made two 
contributions to the literature. First, we expanded the focus of the Ginarte and Park (1997) 
study by considering the determinants of the strength of the enforcement of patent law in 
practice. The results revealed an important insight on what factors influence the strength of 
patent enforcement in a country, in that the number of patent and trademark applications has 
a positive effect on the strength of patent law in practice. This result suggests that the higher 
the number of IP owners (in the form of ownership of patent or trademark rights) who 
11  
attempt to commercialize their rights in a country, the higher the likelihood that they will 
apply pressure on public enforcement agents to effectively enforce their rights in a country. 
Furthermore, we find that higher levels of GDP per capita, R&D expenditure and quality of 
human capital in a country also have a significantly positive effect on the strengthening of 
patent enforcement. Importantly, all five variables found to determine the strength of patent 
enforcement are variables that capture the level and quality of economic and social activity in 
a country, instead of more general variables that relate to e.g. the openness of an economy 
and political conditions.  
Second, we study the determinants of the strength of patent law, focusing on the time 
period since the signing of TRIPS, which was not captured in the study of Ginarte and Park 
(1997). We find that the two main determinants that were significant in the Ginarte and Park 
(1997) study, the level of development of a country and R&D expenditure, continue to have a 
positive effect on the strength of patent law. In addition, we find that the quality of human 
capital has a positive effect on the strength of patent law of a country. These are important 
findings that confirm the contemporary relevance of the Ginarte and Park (1997) study as 
well as highlight that some of the key determinants of strengthening levels of patent law 
continue to be the same as prior to the signing of TRIPS. Importantly, we also find that other 
variables which relate to the general economic and political conditions of a country such as 
market freedom, political freedom and openness do not have the expected effect on the 
strength of patent law anymore. The results showcase that after the signing of the TRIPS 
agreement, variables that relate to the general stance toward trade and the openness of a 
country no longer affect the strength of patent law, whereas variables that outline the 
footprint of the level and quality of economic and social activity in a country are important 
determinants.  
This paper offers a statistical analysis of determinants of the strength of patent 
enforcement at the national level. To develop better understanding of how patent enforcement 
can be strengthened, future research could devote effort in the following areas. First, 
researchers could develop case studies to identify the dynamics and mechanisms with which 
patent and trademark users from different industries and countries influence the development 
of stronger patent enforcement. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that in the pre-
TRIPS years, the global pharmaceutical industry was influential in lobbying for the 
strengthening of patent law internationally. The results of our study suggest that in the years 
after TRIPS, patent and trademark users from a variety of different industries may have 
influenced the strength of patent enforcement. Second, and related to the above, as more 
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firms become active users of patents and trademarks in a country, future research could 
analyze the educational activities undertaken by the national IP Offices to support firms in 
managing, protecting and creating value from their IP and in exploring and exploiting the 
value of IP owned by others, legally and ethically. Such studies could identify the effect of 
different educational activities in stimulating IP usage and identify the best educational 
practices to help develop patent enforcement strength in other countries.  
   
6. Policy implications 
The findings of this study have two important implications for policymakers at the national 
and supranational levels. First, the results suggest that policymakers who aim to strengthen 
patent enforcement activities need to take actions to educate and incentivize innovative firms 
to become familiar with and seek to protect their rights in the country. As UNCTAD (2015, 
p. 65) highlights in its Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development report, 
“As national investors are frequently less aware of their IP rights, they should be sensitized 
on the issue”. Indeed, increasing the number of firms who actively engage with the patent and 
IP systems of the country will increase the number of firms who seek to commercialize their 
newly granted IP rights and who will monitor the market to identify when their rights are 
infringed by competitors. After identifying the infringement of their rights, the new IP 
owners as well as their collective industry associations will in turn apply pressure on the 
public patent enforcement agents who are responsible for enforcing patent law in practice 
(Yang et al., 2004).  
A successful example of providing incentives that aim to increase the number of users 
of a patent system at the national level is found in the targets of China's 12th five-year plan 
(2011-2015), which aimed to upgrade the capabilities of the Chinese manufacturing sector 
through scientific development. One of the targets was focused on providing monetary 
incentives to patent applicants, with an aim of increasing the number of patents in the country 
from 1.7 to 3.3 patents per 10,000 people in the time period (U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 2011). This target equalled a 100 per cent increase in the 
numbers of patents granted. It aimed to enable Chinese firms to become familiar with the 
benefits of the Chinese patent system and to upgrade their manufacturing capabilities by 
commercializing their registered innovations (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2011). Indeed, now that the number of patent applications and patents granted 
in China has risen exponentially over the last years, one of the next areas of focus identified 
in the Chinese government’s 13th five-year plan period is to “ensure strict IPR protection” 
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(SIPO, 2016). Policymakers from other countries could provide similar monetary incentives 
to the Chinese ones, in order to expand the number of users of their patent system, since in 
the long term, this is expected to lead to the strengthening of patent enforcement in a country. 
At the supranational level, policymakers could also consider providing indirect 
monetary incentives that can incentivize patent activity, by exploring ways to expand the 
country coverage of patent protection and (if possible) adopt a regional fee structure for the 
filing and renewal of patents in a group of countries. For example, the European Patent 
Office is planning to launch the “Unitary Patent” in 2019, a new form of patent protection 
that allows IP owners to receive uniform patent protection in 26 member countries of the 
European Union (EU) for a significantly reduced fee (EPO, 2018a). The unitary patent is 
expected to relieve innovators of the validation, translation and maintenance costs of patents 
in each of the 26 EU countries, at a reduced fee that covers patent protection in all countries. 
The overall registration and maintenance cost of a unitary patent for 20 years is expected to 
be €35,555, whereas the equivalent cost of patent registration and maintenance in each of the 
26 countries would be €169,667, a projected saving of €134,112 per patent (EPO, 2018b).6 
The European Patent Office (EPO) also provides subsidies for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) and public research organizations, to incentivize them to register their rights (EPO, 
2018a). National IP offices in other regions could follow the EPO’s example and explore 
potential collaboration with neighboring countries and make it easier for patent owners to 
efficiently and cost-effectively receive patent protection in neighboring countries. The 
Chinese State IP Office has signed agreements with neighboring IP offices such as that of 
Cambodia, which agreed to validate Chinese patents as of 28 March 2018, and that of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, which agreed to recognize the Chinese patent examination 
results (Xinhua News, 2018a, 2018b). Such agreements further incentivize patenting 
activities by Chinese firms as patenting in China can enable the firms to easily expand their 
protection to other countries in the region. 
With regard to the second recommendation, the findings of this study suggest that 
policymakers should aim to increase overall levels of R&D expenditure and invest in 
improving the quality of human capital in their country, since both will boost their country’s 
innovation capability, which in turn leads to increased demand for stronger patent 
enforcement. This is in line with UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development report (2015, p. 42), which highlights that “businesses are more likely to invest 
                                                             
6 The estimates are provided by the EPO using the national renewal fees that were valid as of 1 January 2017. 
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resources in R&D and technological upgrading if their innovations are protected”. Therefore 
whereas our first recommendation focused on increasing the capacity of IP owners in a 
country, our second recommendation focuses on increasing the quality of the innovation 
outputs of IP owners. Investing in these two factors is expected to enable firms to engage 
with higher-level and more advanced technologies that are more likely to require an effective 
patent system, so that patent owners can successfully commercialize their assets (UNCTAD, 
2014). 
Policymakers can consider incentivizing firms to invest more in R&D, particularly at 
the early experimental stages of research, which are more risky but, if successful, are 
expected to lead to the development of valuable IP assets. Contemporary studies generally 
find that R&D subsidies are expected to increase R&D output in the form of patents, 
especially in the European context (Buchman and Kaiser, 2018; Szczygielski et al., 2017). 
With regards to the findings of firms located in developed European countries, R&D 
subsidies were found to increase the number of collaborative R&D projects of German 
biotechnology firms (Broekel and Boschma, 2011) and boost their patenting activity 
(Buchman and Kaiser, 2018). The same positive effect is found for R&D subsidies to small 
and medium-sized Italian firms; however, the R&D subsidy cost required to produce one 
additional patent is high, ranging between €206,000 and €310,000 (Szczygielski et al., 2017). 
A similar positive effect between R&D subsidies and innovation is found for firms from 
European countries catching up on technology, such as Poland and Turkey (Bronzini and 
Pizelli, 2016). 
An example of a successful R&D subsidy program is the Scientific Research and 
Experimental Development Tax Incentive Program (SR&ED) of the Canadian government 
which “encourages and supports scientific research and experimental development…by 
letting you deduct your SR&ED costs from your income for tax purposes” (Government of 
Canada, 2018). SR&ED incentives are considered an integral component of the Canadian 
innovation system, supporting innovative small and start-up businesses and attracting (and 
retaining) highly qualified human capital in the country (CPA, 2018). Importantly, such 
incentives can have a multiplying effect in terms of boosting investments in R&D, since 
successful projects are expected to attract further cycles of R&D funding from internal or 
external sources. Overall, when policymakers consider developing such policies to influence 
the determinants of patent enforcement, they also need to simultaneously undertake reforms 
that directly aim to improve the functioning and effectiveness of patent systems. 
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Figure 1: Determinants of strength of patent law and strength of patent law enforcement   
 
 
 
 
  
  
Patent Law 
Strength 
Pressure factors 
• Pressure from intellectual property 
rights owners who operate in a country: 
(i) number of patents, (ii) number of 
trademarks 
 
Strength of 
Patent Law 
Enforcement 
Factors determining incentives 
• Factors affecting aggregate output level: 
(i) human capital, (ii) R&D investment 
• Factors affecting aggregate price level: 
(i) openness to trade, (ii) market 
freedom, (iii) political freedom.  
• Infrastructure cost: developing and 
operating patent law infrastructure 
(relative to national income per capita) 
(Adapted from Ginarte and Park, 1997) 
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Table 1. Variable description, measurement and sourcesError! Not a valid link. 
Variable Description/Measurement Data Source 
Patent law strength Index by Park (2008) Park (2008) 
Enforcement strength of patent 
law  
Index by Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2014) 
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) 
GDP per capita  Logarithm of real GDP per capita World Bank (2015a) 
R&D / GDP % of research and development 
expenditure over GDP 
World Bank (2015b) 
Secondary enrolment % of population that it is enrolled in 
secondary schools 
World Bank (2015c) 
Political freedom Measure of political risk in which 
higher values indicate a riskier 
environment 
Freedom House (2015) 
Market freedom Measure of market freedom in 
which higher values indicate more 
freedom in business transactions 
Heritage Foundation (2015) 
Openness  Sum of volume of exports plus 
imports over GDP 
World Bank (2015d, 2015e) 
Trademark applications per 
capita 
Logarithm of applications to register 
a trademark with a national or 
regional intellectual property (IP) 
office over population 
WIPO (2015) 
FDI / GDP Sum of foreign assets and liabilities 
over GDP 
World Bank (2015f) 
Patent applications per capita Logarithm of worldwide patent 
applications filed through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty procedure or 
with a national patent office for 
exclusive rights for an invention 
over population 
WIPO (2015) 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Patent law strength 3.987 0.662 1.08 4.67 
Enforcement strength of patent 
law  6.42 2.126 2.6 9.9 
GDP per capita 9.486 1.191 6.271 11.124 
R&D / GDP 1.441 1.082 0.01 4.835 
Secondary enrolment 96.747 13.476 42.298 160.619 
Political freedom 1.804 1.475 1 7 
Market freedom 74.213 12.979 36.3 100 
Openness 88.083 57.086 18.756 446.754 
Trademark applications per capita 0.046 0.099 0.002 1.307 
FDI / GDP 0.817 1.153 0.04 11.034 
Patent applications per capita 0.05 0.074 0.004 0.355 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients 
  
Patent 
law 
strength 
Enforcement 
strength of 
patent law 
GDP 
per 
capita 
R&D / 
GDP 
Secondary 
enrolment 
Political 
freedom 
Market 
freedom Openness 
Trademark 
applications 
per capita 
FDI / 
GDP 
Patent 
applications 
per capita 
Patent law strength 1           Enforcement 
strength of patent 
law 
0.525 1          
GDP per capita 0.679 0.834 1         R&D / GDP 0.493 0.662 0.664 1        Secondary 
enrolment 0.622 0.671 0.755 0.542 1       
Political freedom -0.502 -0.563 -0.661 -0.39 -0.533 1      Market freedom 0.385 0.684 0.682 0.401 0.461 -0.484 1     Openness -0.072 0.136 0.111 -0.099 -0.087 -0.036 0.266 1    Trademark 
applications per 
capita 
0.479 0.025 0.407 0.169 0.299 -0.209 0.494 0.353 1 
  
FDI / GDP 0.159 0.343 0.309 0.057 0.082 -0.204 0.424 0.779 0.368 1  Patent applications 
per capita 
0.643 0.368 0.646 0.634 0.461 -0.346 0.545 0.131 0.532 0.225 1 
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Table 4. Regression results for the determinants of the strength of patent law  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Patent law strength  Patent law strength Patent law strength 
GDP per capita 0.358*** 0.349*** 0.376*** 
[0.0315] [0.0290] [0.0323] 
R&D / GDP 0.0556*** 0.0573** 0.0535** 
[0.0215] [0.0233] [0.0214] 
Secondary enrolment 0.00149* 0.00232*** 0.00173** 
[0.000869] [0.000820] [0.000861] 
Political freedom 0.00398 0.00522 0.00348 
[0.00999] [0.00939] [0.0100] 
Market freedom -0.00231*** -0.00197*** -0.00218*** 
[0.000684] [0.000652] [0.000679] 
Openness -0.000558 -0.000621* -0.000593* 
[0.000359] [0.000345] [0.000356] 
Trademark applications per capita -0.440***  -0.270* 
[0.137]  [0.158] 
FDI / GDP 0.0183 0.0256* 0.0205 
[0.0157] [0.0145] [0.0155] 
Patent applications per capita  -0.409 -0.705** 
 [0.310] [0.316] 
Constant 0.498* 0.495* 0.333 
[0.285] [0.269] [0.293] 
LR (Heteroscedasticity) Test 559.12*** 621.70*** 568.09*** 
Wooldridge (Autocorrelation) Test  2012.432*** 1000.628 961.833*** 
    
No. of observations 546 559 546 
1. Standard errors in brackets. 
2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
3.  Feasible general least squares estimator is applied, assuming a heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-sectional correlation and AR(1).
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Table 5. Regression results for the determinants of the strength of patent law 
enforcement in practice 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Enforcement 
strength of patent 
law  
Enforcement 
strength of patent 
law 
Enforcement 
strength of patent 
law 
GDP per capita 0.956*** 1.179*** 0.929*** 
[0.0613] [0.0705] [0.0599] 
R&D / GDP 0.427*** 0.246*** 0.373*** 
[0.0642] [0.0642] [0.0668] 
Secondary enrolment 0.00516** 0.00876*** 0.00542** 
[0.00231] [0.00212] [0.00225] 
Political freedom -0.0380 -0.0347 -0.0389* 
[0.0239] [0.0222] [0.0227] 
Market freedom 0.00194 0.00392** 0.00196 
[0.00216] [0.00199] [0.00216] 
Openness 0.0000661 0.00100 -0.000152 
[0.000849] [0.000741] [0.000816] 
Trademark applications per capita 0.164***  0.140*** 
[0.0305]  [0.0304] 
FDI / GDP 0.0950*** 0.0154 0.0849*** 
[0.0328] [0.0283] [0.0306] 
Patent applications per capita  0.0617* 0.113*** 
 [0.0319] [0.0321] 
Constant -3.105*** -5.641*** -2.393*** 
[0.513] [0.619] [0.524] 
LR (Heteroscedasticity) Test 419.53*** 435.53*** 460.28*** 
Wooldridge (Autocorrelation) Test  68.179*** 73.159*** 69.278*** 
    
No. of Observations 546 559 546 
Note:  
1. Standard errors in brackets. 
2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
3.  Feasible general least squares estimator is applied, assuming a heteroskedastic error structure with no 
cross-sectional correlation and AR(1). 
